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The Ebola epidemic in West Africa was stopped by an enormous concerted
effort of local communities and national and international organizations. It is
not clear, however, how much the public health response and behavioural
changes in affected communities, respectively, contributed to ending the out-
break. Here, we analyse the epidemic in Lofa County, Liberia, lasting from
March to November 2014, by reporting a comprehensive time line of events
and estimating the time-varying transmission intensity using a mathematical
model of Ebola transmission. Model fits to the epidemic show an alternation
of peaks and troughs in transmission, consistent with highly heterogeneous
spread. This is combined with an overall decline in the reproduction number
of Ebola transmission from early August, coinciding with an expansion of
the local Ebola treatment centre. We estimate that healthcare seeking approxi-
mately doubled over the course of the outbreak, and that isolation of those
seeking healthcare reduced their reproduction number by 62% (mean estimate,
95% credible interval (CI) 59–66). Both expansion of bed availability and
improved healthcare seeking contributed to ending the epidemic, highlighting
the importance of community engagement alongside clinical intervention.
This article is part of the themed issue ‘The 2013–2016 West African
Ebola epidemic: data, decision-making and disease control’.1. Introduction
The epidemic of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa, has, at the time of
writing, caused more than 11 000 deaths reported from more than 28 000
cases [1]. The outbreak was first identified in March 2014 in South Western
Guinea [2–4]. By 30 March 2014, the infection had spread across the border,
and the first cases were reported from Liberia, more specifically from Lofa
County near the northern border with Guinea. Following this first small cluster
of cases, in early June, a large outbreak was observed in Lofa, with rapid
growth in case numbers between early July and late August. The outbreak
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decreasing to zero cases of EVD by early November [5,6].
Ebola spreads through contact with bodily fluids that con-
tinue to be infectious after death [7]. This makes finding and
isolating infected patients and preventing transmission at
funerals crucial components of the public health response
[8]. Ebola treatment centres (ETC) are specifically designed
to provide isolation beds for infected patients, with staff
trained to minimize the risk of onward transmission to them-
selves or others by wearing protective gear and practising the
highest levels of hygiene. Infection at funerals can be pre-
vented by conducting burials where only those wearing
appropriate equipment touch the body of the deceased.
The exponential rise in case numbers in the summer of 2014
in Lofa County and elsewhere triggered a large-scale inter-
national response of humanitarian assistance to West Africa.
In Lofa County, this led to a rapid expansion in ETC bed
capacity, from 10 beds in June 2014 to about 100 by mid-
August. Beyond its humanitarian contribution through the
provision of appropriate care for a greater number of patients,
providing a sufficient number of beds can contribute to curbing
an epidemic by removing cases from the community and
isolating them, thereby preventing further spread.
Asmuch of transmission of Ebola occurs in (not necessarily
nuclear) families, communities and at funerals, behaviour
change can have a great impact on the course of an outbreak.
This makes it important to understand the cultural contexts
and processes that can trigger such change as well as its
impact on the transmission [9]. Experiences in earlier outbreaks
of Marburg virus disease in Angola [10] and EVD in Uganda
[11] and in Sierra Leone during the current outbreak [12],
emphasize the importance of health promotion interventions,
in particular the need to understand the local context and
culture, and work closely with community leaders to adapt
the intervention to the setting [13,14]. World Health Organiz-
ation (WHO) Standard Operating Procedures for controlling
Ebola and Marburg virus epidemics highlight the importance
of a comprehensive, integrated approach [15]. Around the
same time as the expansion of ETC bed capacity, a suite of com-
munity-based health promotion and social mobilization
activities were launched in Lofa County. To what extent
these activities and ETC bed expansion contributed to end
the epidemic is unclear.
Mathematical modelling of EVD epidemics has previously
provided insights into the different routes of Ebola trans-
mission [16,17] and the potential role of different control
strategies, including interventions based on case management
and safe handling of dead bodies as well as community-based
interventions [18–23]. A recent modelling study has suggested
that the spread of awareness and consequent self-initiated
behavioural changes may have played a substantial role in
turning the epidemic in Lofa County [24], but did not include
a full account of the public health response. Another study has
suggested that community transmission of Ebola in Liberia
was reduced by 40–80% over the course of the outbreak.
The provision of hospital beds, on the other hand, has been
estimated to have averted more than 50 000 cases in Sierra
Leone [25]. A recent study has found that control of the
Ebola epidemic in Liberia was achieved through reductions
in community transmission [26].
Here, we aim to characterize the epidemiological features
of, and the public health response to, the EVD outbreak in
Lofa County in 2014, and assess the role of the multiplecomponents of intervention in the control of the outbreak. To
tease out the impact of different clinical and community-
based interventions, and to estimate the relative contribution
of these to containing the epidemic in Lofa County, we fitted
a mathematical model of Ebola virus transmission with a
time-varying transmission rate to the series of ETC admissions.
This allowed us to fully account for the progression of EVD in
infected individuals and associated delays, and thus to pin-
point when declines or increases in transmission rates must
have occurred to produce the observed time series of cases.2. Methods
(a) Data
To record suspect cases of EVD and suspect community deaths, a
case notification form was completed by the district health officer
(DHO) or member of their staff. This identified: symptoms,
date of onset of symptoms, prior exposure to a known case of
EVD, attendance at a funeral or traditional healer, and family
or community contacts to whom the individual may have trans-
mitted the infection. Cases were considered suspect, probable or
confirmed according to WHO and Liberian Ministry of Health
and Social Welfare (MoH) case definitions [27]. Laboratory
examination was conducted whenever possible to confirm the
diagnosis: reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR) analysis was performed on a sample of whole venous
blood from patients admitted to the ETC or on an oral mucosal
swab from community deaths by the Institut Pasteur laboratory,
Conakry, Guinea (30 March–4 April 2014), the European Mobile
Laboratory based in Gue´cke´dou, Guinea (4 April–12 September
2014) and later the European Mobile Laboratory in Foya, Liberia
(13 September–10 November 2014) [28,29]. From the line lists of
suspect, probable and confirmed cases of EVD in the ETC and
reported community deaths, we extracted the time course of ETC
admissions and distribution of times from onset to death, and
for ETC cases the distributions of time from the onset of symptoms
to admission and length of stay. For calculating admission delays,
we removed two patients with reported delays of more than three
weeks, and for calculating the time from onset to deaths, two
patients with reported times of more than a month.
During the outbreak in Lofa County, a complete registry of
deaths was not maintained and formal population-based surveys
of knowledge, attitudes and behaviour relevant to EVD were not
conducted. The chronology and nature of the interventions of
various actors were derived from operational records, through
participant observation and unstructured, qualitative interviews
with key informants in participating organizations and the com-
munity. Media messages in the county were also informally
monitored. Community-based interventions to control the EVD
outbreak included: social mobilization to influence community
knowledge, attitudes and behaviour; and outreach teams that
assessed and transported suspect cases, provided safe burials
and disinfected dwellings. The MoH, Me´decins Sans Frontie`res
(MSF) and UNICEF led the former activity, whereas the MoH
and MSF provided the latter services. The number of individuals
contacted per week by the MSF health promotion teams is
presented as a measure of these community-based activities.
(b) Transmission model
A stochastic compartmental model of Ebola virus transmission
was constructed and parametrized using detailed information
obtained from the line list of ETC admissions. Themodel extended
the classic susceptible–exposed–infectious–recovered (SEIR)
model as follows: at time t, susceptibles (S) experience a (time-
varying) force of infection l(t). Upon infection, susceptibles
S E
IH
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rht
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γ
a
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q
Figure 1. Schematic of the model. The transitions used to calculate the
weekly incidence of ETU admissions that was compared with the data are
coloured in red, infectious compartments are shaded red and the compart-
ments inside the ETC marked by a box.
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infected but not yet infectious. After the incubation period,
people in the exposed class move into one of two infectious (I)
classes (with rate r), depending on whether they are healthcare
seeking (IH, for (H)ospital, where these individualsmay ultimately
arrive) or not (IC, for (C)ommunity, where these individuals will
remain). With time-varying probability ht, individuals leaving
the E compartment enter the IH compartment where they remain
in the community until they get admitted to the ETC (HR or HD,
with time-varying rate kt), recover (RC) or die (DH, both with
rate g) and get a safe burial (BH). With (time-varying) probability
(12 ht), they enter the IC compartment where they remain until
they recover (RC) or die (DC, both with rate g) and get an unsafe
burial (BC, at rate a). Individuals from the IH compartment who
get admitted to the ETC are split into those (HD) who eventually
die (DH) and get a safe burial, and those (HR) who recover (RH),
with the relative probabilities of entering the HD or HR compart-
ments given by the case fatality rate c. Hospital admissions (into
the HR and HD compartments) occur with multiplicative
gamma-distributed noise (mean 1, standard deviation 0.1), a con-
venient choice for a rate that is subject to random variation
[30,31]. A schematic illustration of the model is given in figure 1.
In the model, when infectious people are split into those that
seek healthcare (IH) and those that do not (IC), the ones that
would seek healthcare (i.e. are in IH) but do not get to the ETC
(because they die or recover before) are safely buried. The ones
who would not seek healthcare (i.e. are in IC) are not safely
buried and remain infectious (in DC) until they are buried (BC).
While we did not have any data to inform this choice, the ration-
ale is that these might be part of resistant communities who
would not call for a safe burial. Note that, as healthcare seeking
changes during the course of the outbreak, so does the
proportion of dead that is safely buried.
Becausewe had reports that no patient arriving at the ETC had
ever been rejected in Lofa, we did not include any effects of ETC
capacity and occupancy in fitting the model to the epidemic trajec-
tory. When considering counterfactual scenarios later, however,
we did include one where ETC capacity was limited and patients
rejected if it was full (see section ‘Counterfactual scenarios’ below).
Because a focus of this work was on timing, we used the
patient data to parametrize the model with realistic transition
time distributions. Transition times in standard compartmental
models can be made to follow gamma distributions with integer
shape parameters, that is Erlang distributions, by putting com-
partments in sequence [32]. We fitted gamma distributions to
the observed distributions of the admission delay, the length of
stay of survivors and the time from onset to death of casualties,
with rounded-down and rounded-up shape parameters usingmaximum-likelihood estimation with the R [33] package
fitdistrplus [34], and chose the one with the greater likelihood as
an estimate of the shape parameter of the Erlang distribution
corresponding to each transition. The compartments were then
split into the number of subcompartments given by the shape
parameter, and transition rate multiplied with the same shape par-
ameter, to recover the correct mean transition times. Where
individuals were subject to multiple Erlang-distributed transitions
(in IH), they would have an index for each of these transitions. The
index with respect to any transition was maintained under other
transitions such that, for example, people admitted to the ETC
late in their infectious period would proceed to death quicker
than those who were admitted early in the infectious period.
We assumed that the symptomatic period coincided with
the infectious period, as suggested by a study of a previous
Ebola outbreak where infection was found to have been trans-
mitted by ill patients both in early and late stages of illness
[35]. We further assumed that infectiousness was the same for
those who proceeded to recovery or death, and did not change
after death until buried (unless safely buried), the simplest
assumption in the absence of any data to inform this matter.
We did, however, consider a modified model where trans-
missibility increased late in the infectious period and in an
unsafe funeral when calculating the effect of isolation on the
reproduction number, as it has been suggested that patients
might become more infectious during later stages of their
infection [19,35].
We included the time-varying admission delay by weekly
varying the rate of admission kt according to the observed
mean (figure 2). The case fatality rate was extracted from the
line list as 67%, and the population size of Lofa County set to
N ¼ 270 114 [36]. The incubation period was set to 9.4 days
with shape parameter 2 [37]. The average period of infectious-
ness after death for those unsafely buried was taken to be 1
day [17]. All delays and their corresponding parameters are
summarized in table 1.
In order to track changes in transmission owing to behav-
ioural or other changes in the community, we assumed that
both the proportion seeking healthcare and the transmission
rate could change over time; the extent and direction of change
was estimated during the model fitting process. Healthcare
seeking was modelled as a sigmoid function,
ht ¼ hearly þ
hlateð1 hearlyÞ
1þ e expðt tÞ , ð2:1Þ
where hearly and hlate are the proportion of people seeking health-
care early and late in the epidemic, respectively, t is an inflection
point of the sigmoid and e is the speed of change. This functional
form ensured that healthcare seeking was either monotonically
increasing or decreasing, as we would expect attitudes to health-
care to either improve or worsen during the course of the
outbreak as a result of behavioural changes and health promotion
activities, but not undergo rapid jumps.
The time-varying transmission rate bt, on the other hand,
was assumed to be more likely to undergo sudden changes if
there were, for example, superspreading events or spatial or
other heterogeneities in transmission. We therefore modelled it
as a weekly varying random variable that followed a normal
distribution with given mean b and standard deviation s
bt  N ðb, s2Þ: ð2:2Þ
Assuming that no transmission occurs in an ETC or during
a safe burial, the force of infection at any time is
lt ¼ bt
IC þ IH þDC
N
: ð2:3Þ
Assuming that there was no depletion of susceptibles (S  N ),
the time-varying community reproduction number (i.e. the
confirmed
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Figure 2. Timeline of the EVD epidemic in Lofa County. (a– e) Data: number of hospital admissions, community deaths, days from onset to ETC admission (median
and IQR), people reached by MSF health promotion (HP) activities, time line of events. ( f,g) Modelling results: community reproduction number (i.e. the
reproduction number in the absence of isolation beds) and the proportion of patients seeking healthcare. Black line: median; grey area: interquartile range.
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does not seek healthcare) is
RC,t ¼ bt
g
þ cbt
a
, ð2:4Þ
the twoparts of the sum representing transmission before and after
death. For those seeking healthcare and isolated (and, if necessary,
safely buried), this changes to approximately:
RH,t  bt
gþ k : ð2:5Þ
An exact calculation of this reproduction number calculated
using a next-generation matrix [38] is given in the electronic
supplementary material. It deviates slightly from the one inequation (2.5) because of the discrete nature of the multiple
sequential compartments introduced to obtain Erlang-distributed
transmission times.
The ratio between the two reproduction numbers is
approximately
r ¼ RH,t
RC,t
 gaðgþ kÞðaþ cgÞ : ð2:6Þ
We calculated a range of values for this ratio using boot-
strapped parameter values estimated from the line list of cases
and using the exact formula for RH given in the electronic
supplementary material.
The overall reproduction number at any time is
Rt ¼ ð1 htÞRC,t þ htRH,t: ð2:7Þ
Table 1. Delays in the model, the corresponding rate parameter, the mean of
the delay (the reciprocal of the rate) and the shape parameter of the Erlang
distribution governing transitions. The parameter means are given in days.
delay
rate
parameter mean shape source
incubation
period
r 9.4 2 WHO Ebola
response
team [37]
infectious
period
g 7.8 3 data
admission kt variable 2 data
ETC stay
(survivors)
u 13.0 10 data
unsafe burial a 1 1 assumption
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and reporting assumed to follow a Poisson distribution centred
around weekly incidence. The likelihood of each trajectory was
obtained by multiplying the probability densities of observation
at each time point, and the likelihood of a given set of parameter
values was estimated using a particle filter [39]. The model was
fitted to the time series of ETC admissions of confirmed and
probable EVD cases using a Bayesian approach. Metropolis–
Hastings Markov chain Monte Carlo in combination with the
estimated likelihoods from the particle filter (a method called
pMCMC) was used to sample parameter combinations and
state trajectories from the posterior distribution of the parameters
[40]. The filtered trajectories of the transmission rate bt could
then be used to track the behaviour of the transmission rate
over time [31,41], and we used this to calculate the corresponding
time-varying overall reproduction number (the average number
of secondary cases generated by each case). Generally, if at any
time the overall reproduction number is greater than 1, case
numbers will typically rise whilst if it is less than 1, case numbers
will generally decline.
The initial conditions and the parameters of the time-varying
rates were estimated during the fitting process: the number of
infectious people in Lofa County on 26 May 2014 (one week
before the beginning of the time series of ETC admissions), the
mean and standard deviation of the transmission rate, and the
four parameters governing the proportion of the population
seeking healthcare (hearly, hlate, e and t).
The stochastic elements of the model were updated at every
week-long time step, and the model run as ordinary differential
equations between time steps. The fitting procedure was
implemented using libbi [42] with the rbi [43] and rbi.helpers [44]
R packages on a high-performance computing cluster. After
affirming that the method could recover the time-varying trans-
mission rate from simulated data, we fitted the model using 100
parallel chains of 10 000 iterations each in the Markov chain
Monte Carlo sampler. Convergence and mixing was confirmed
visually. All code and data are available online at http://github.
com/sbfnk/ebola_lofa, and instructions for reproducing the
modelling results given in the electronic supplementary material.
(c) Counterfactual scenarios
We adapted the model fitted to the ETC admissions data to
explore counterfactual scenarios. To measure the impact of bed
availability, we considered a model where limitations in capacity
would prevent patients from getting admitted to the ETC. To do
so, we modified our model to keep track of the number of peoplecurrently in the hospital. If this was at capacity, the infected indi-
vidual would stay in the community and keep transmitting until
there was space. After verifying that a model with estimated bed
capacity as it was available during the outbreak (calculated as the
maximal daily number of patients in the ETC up to any given
week minus the current number of non-Ebola patients) yielded
the observed epidemic, we explored hypothetical scenarios
where there would be either (i) no expansion of bed capacity
(and unlike the case in reality, rejection of patients once all
beds were occupied) or (ii) no changes in healthcare-seeking
behaviour, i.e. ht fixed to its value in the first week.3. Results
Between 18 March and 9 November 2014, a total of 466 con-
firmed and probable cases of EVD were identified (453
confirmed, 13 probable), of which 396 were ETC admissions
(385 confirmed) and 70 community deaths (68 confirmed).
The peak incidence of 67 reported new confirmed andprobable
cases of EVD occurred during the week of 18–24 August (58
patients admitted to the ETC, nine community deaths). This
was followed by a steady decline to one confirmed case
admitted to the ETC and no confirmed community death
during the week of 20–26 October (figure 2). The number of
community deaths reported (and thus provided a safe burial)
increased from the end of June to a peak in the period from
mid-September to mid-October, but these were progressively
less likely to be owing to EVD. The proportion of community
deaths confirmed positive remained near 90% until mid-
August, then declined thereafter. Similarly, the proportion of
ETC admissions that were confirmed EVD positive declined
from 90% in mid-June to around 50% in mid-September.
A detailed description of the outbreak and the response can
be found in box 1.
Males (48%) and females (52%) were equally affected by
the outbreak. Most (63%) of the cases were older adults
(greater than or equal to 40 years of age), a third (33%)
were young adults (15–39 years of age), whereas a minority
were children (less than 15 years of age; 2%). Overall, 310
(67%) of the admitted patients with confirmed or probable
EVD died of the disease. Within Lofa County, the case fatality
rate did not differ by district of residence, between men and
women, nor did it change significantly over time. Of the con-
firmed and probable cases of EVD, 21 (5%) were healthcare
workers, of whom 14 (67%) died, six recovered and one
had an unknown outcome.
The epidemic first affected the western districts of Foya,
Kolahun andVahun, and later the eastern districts of Voinjama,
Zorzor and Salayea,QuarduBoundi (figure 3). No cases of local
origin were seen in Foya, Kolahun or Vahun districts after mid-
September, whereas local cases persisted in the eastern districts
until the end of October. During the final weeks of October,
more than half of the cases of EVD were exposed outside of
Lofa County, in either Monrovia or Guinea.
The delay between symptom onset and ETC admission
increased from a median of 3 days in June (50% of cases
being admitted within 2–4 days), to 5 in July (50% between
3 and 7 days), before dropping again to 3 in August (50%
between 2 and 5 days), September (50% between 2 and 5
days) and October (50% between 2 and 4 days). Weekly
changes in the delay to admission can be seen in figure 2.
Our model reproduced the trend in hospital admissions
between June andNovember (figure 4). Because of correlations
Box 1. Outbreak and response.
The early outbreak. The index case in Liberia, a 35 year old woman from Foya, had travelled to Guinea and became ill on 13
March. She was brought back to Foya, Liberia on 17 March by a 30 year old female relative and was admitted the following
day to the Borma Hospital, Foya. She was confirmed EVD positive by testing at the Institut Pasteur Laboratory, Conakry, and
died 20 March. Her female relative subsequently fell ill and was hospitalized at Foya Borma Hospital, but later fled to Mon-
rovia continuing on to Firestone, Margibi County, Liberia where she died of confirmed EVD. Two male healthcare workers
from the hospital, who had cared for the index case, aged 48 and 46, fell ill, were confirmed positive, and died on 31 March
and 4 April, respectively. A 30 year old woman who had washed the clothes of the index case during her illness also fell ill,
was confirmed positive and died on 1 April. Aside from this cluster, another case was confirmed in a 55 year old female from
Foya who had returned from Guinea during the three weeks prior to the onset of her illness on 31 March 31. With the support
of WHO, all deaths of confirmed cases received a safe burial. Following this cluster that occurred exclusively in Foya town, no
further cases were confirmed in Lofa County until early June.
The second wave of the epidemic began in Lofa County on 6 June when a case was confirmed in a 46 year old man from
Foya district who had been partially trained as a nurse. In May, he had travelled to a nearby village in Sierra Leone where he
had cared for his ill mother, administering two intravenous infusions and two injections of medication. His mother died later
that month from confirmed EVD. After returning to Liberia, he developed symptoms on 2 June, and was admitted to the
ETC, Foya, on 5 June. He was confirmed positive and subsequently discharged recovered.
In the second and third weeks of June, a second large cluster of cases occurred in an extended family in Foya. The 65 year
old matriarch of the family who lived with her husband in nearby Sierra Leone became ill on 20 May. She was taken to Foya
by her family where she was admitted briefly to the Foya Borma Hospital with suspect EVD. As she was not improving, and
before she could be confirmed as a case, she was taken to the family home in Foya where she began vomiting blood and died
on 27 May. Her body was washed and dressed and transported in a rented minibus back to Sierra Leone where her burial
took place. Subsequently, 16 people, including nine family members in Foya and seven individuals who attended the burial
in Sierra Leone, died of confirmed EVD in both countries.
Incident cases stabilized until mid-July, but thereafter there was a rapid and geographically widespread increase in
reported number of admissions to the Foya ETC and community deaths owing to confirmed EVD.
National and international response. The response to the EVD outbreak in Lofa County was led by the district and county-level
MoH health team under the coordination of a National Ebola Task Force which was established on 30 March 2014 and com-
prised government agencies and international partners. On declaring the outbreak, the MoH recommended the avoidance of
personal contact through handshakes, hugging and community gatherings and a halt to traditional burials, which typically
involve family members washing the body and touching the corpse.
In early April, the WHO conducted a needs assessment, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention supported the
development of an epidemiological surveillance and contact tracing system and, from its existing operational base in
Gue´cke´dou, Guinea, Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (MSF) provided technical advice and training in community health pro-
motion, case management and the establishment of isolation facilities, but was not involved in the direct provision of
services in Lofa County until August.
By mid-July, WHO, MoH and MSF identified significant gaps in the response to the now-accelerating epidemic: low cov-
erage of contact tracing, denial and resistance in communities, weak data management, inadequate infection prevention and
control in health facilities, insufficient outreach capacity, insufficient safe burial capacity, and weak leadership and coordi-
nation at a national level [45]. WHO provided training for a cadre of General Community Health Volunteers and
supervisors in an effort to improve the incomplete contact tracing. A comprehensive assessment of financial, logistical
and human resource needs was incorporated into the Liberia Operational Plan for Accelerated Response to the Re-occurrence
of Ebola Epidemic [46].
By early August, however, it was apparent that the epidemic in Lofa County and elsewhere in Liberia was spreading out
of control. The national government declared a 90 day state of emergency on 6 August, imposing a 21.00 curfew, closing mar-
kets, schools and other public institutions and restricting both public gatherings and the movement of people across
international borders. A number of communities restricted the entry of individuals from elsewhere, especially those
coming from other districts and neighbouring countries. On 7 August, WHO declared the EVD epidemic in West Africa a
Public Health Emergency of International Concern, invoking the 2005 International Health Regulations [47] and establishing
an IHR committee for the EVD outbreak.
Clinical interventions. The first cases of EVD in Lofa County were identified and treated at Borma Hospital in Foya, an existing
MoH facility. In response to the need for improved infection prevention and control, a 10 bed ETC was established on 20
April 2014 by the MoH with technical assistance from MSF, in an existing building located on the edge of the town of
Foya that had formerly served as a refugee transit centre. Nursing, hygiene and administrative staff of the MoH were
seconded to this unit with training provided by MSF. However, from the second week of April until the end of May, no
further cases were identified in Lofa County. During this period, both the ETC and staff were on standby and community
health promotion activities were minimal. Key informants indicate that most residents at the time doubted that Ebola was
truly present in their communities.
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With the reappearance of EVD in June, a non-governmental humanitarian organization, supported by MSF, took over the
management of the Foya ETC. However, rapidly increasing numbers of EVD cases in July led to overcrowding in this facility
with up to 40 patients, and necessitated the construction of a new 100 bed ETC of wood and plastic sheeting adjacent to the
original centre in early August. Patients were transferred into the new facility, built and managed thereafter by MSF, on 10
August. The new ETC was designed to emphasize transparency in its activities by allowing family and community members
to see patients receiving care. Provisions were made to house out-of-town patients’ families and to allow visits at a safe 2 m
distance.
Beginning in September, an MSF psycho-social team, comprising national and international mental health professionals,
provided counselling and support for recovered ETC patients and their families both during their hospitalization and on their
return to their home communities.
By July, many health structures were closed or operating only intermittently owing to fear of disease transmission on the
part of both patients and staff. However, beginning at the end of August, the MoH and several international partners pro-
vided training and equipment to strengthen infection control and triage practice in the existing healthcare structures, salary
supplements to Liberian staff engaged in the Ebola response, and vehicles and fuel to the MoH health teams [48].
Community-based interventions. A protocol to systematically investigate suspect cases of EVD in the community was estab-
lished in early August, implemented first in the Foya and Voinjama districts, and later in the rest of the county. MSF and
MoH set up Ebola telephone ‘hotlines’, enabling community members to alert the healthcare team to suspect cases and
deaths. Calls were triaged, and an outreach team dispatched to investigate suspect cases or deaths. Transport of suspect
cases, home decontamination and safe burial of corpses was performed according to established protocols [15]. The patient
or, in the case of a death, the family of the deceased, would be interviewed using the national Ebola Case Notification Form
to determine if the individual met the WHO definition of a suspect or probable case. If so, personal protective equipment
(PPE) would be donned by the staff, the patient assisted into the ambulance (the cargo area of a pick-up truck covered
with a canopy) for transport to the ETC, and the home of the patient decontaminated. If more than one patient was trans-
ported, all patients wore an impermeable gown, gloves and surgical mask. In the case of a suspect or probable death owing
to EVD, a safe burial would be performed and the home of the deceased decontaminated according to established protocols
[15,49]. From August, in addition to responding to hotline alerts, MSF outreach teams visited communities with ongoing
transmission chains to conduct active case finding and bring suspect cases to the ETC for assessment.
Contacts of suspect cases and deaths were registered by the DHO at the time of case notification. Contact tracing was
conducted by community volunteers supervised by MoH staff for 21 days following their last suspected exposure, either
in person or by mobile phone, according to WHO protocols [50]. Accurate indicators of the completeness of contact tracing
were not available to us; however, it was felt by key informants to have become progressively more complete from September
onwards.
Health promotion efforts by several non-governmental organizations began in March, but were of limited geographical
reach and intensity owing to limitations in transportation and human resources. In the run-up to the county election in July,
at least one candidate distributed distinctive hand washing buckets to a number of larger villages as a preventive measure.
Yet, in July, an outreach team was forced to withdraw from one community when it met with community opposition and
violence. With an increased availability of vehicles and personnel from MSF and other international partners after mid-
August, health promotion activity intensified and extended to outlying communities. MSF anthropologists and health pro-
moters together with Liberian staff knowledgeable about local customs and languages, met first with local village leaders and
later with community members in public meetings. Priority was given to those communities in which cases had recently
occurred. The teams explored the community’s beliefs about EVD, EVD prevention, the treatment and services provided
at the ETC, and sought to clarify any misconceptions. Whenever possible, teams were accompanied on their visits by patients
from the community who had been discharged recovered from the ETC. Representatives of each community, including com-
munity leaders, received training in EVD and were invited to tour the ETC. After July, there were no further reports of Ebola
response teams encountering community resistance or violence.
Beginning in August, a range of communication strategies were used to promote the understanding of the real threat of
Ebola, the early identification of symptoms, the prevention of spread of the disease, the use of the Ebola ‘hotline’ to refer
suspect patients to the ETC, and the need for safe burial practices. Multiple, but not necessarily coordinated programmes,
were launched by the national government, the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), MSF and a
number of media outlets. In September and October, radio and video clips using music, drama and personal testimonials
in a range of local languages were made widely available. Local musicians appeared alongside MSF health promotion
teams during community outreach. A number of MoH district health teams met with community leaders, youth groups,
unions, marketing associations and community-based organizations to promote these messages.
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themean estimate for the initial number of infected peoplewas
34 (interquartile range, IQR, 9–43, 95% credible interval, CI,
3–146, uniform prior range 0–200) and was negatively corre-
lated with the average transmission rate. The mean estimate
of the mean community reproduction number was 1.5 (IQR0.7–2.0, 95% CI 0.1–3.9, uniform prior range 0–10), itself posi-
tively correlated with the early proportion of people seeking
healthcare. That is, for more people seeking healthcare a
higher transmission rate was required to create the observed
data, as a larger proportion of the population was being
isolated. The mean estimate for the weekly standard deviation
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Figure 3. Geographical progression of the epidemic. Shades of grey indicate the number of Ebola cases admitted to the ETC, darker shades reflecting more cases
(maximum: 59 in Quardu Bundi district, August).
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Figure 4. Model and data. Model fits to hospital admissions. Median: black
line, IQR: dark shaded area, 95% credible interval: light shaded area. Data on
weekly ETC admissions are shown as points. The shown fits are filtered
trajectories from the posterior distribution of simulated observations.
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 on November 21, 2017http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from in the transmission rate (on the scale of the community repro-
duction number RC) was 4.5 (IQR 3.1–5.6, 95% CI 1.8–9.0,
uniform prior range 0–10).
The estimated community reproduction number (i.e. the
average number of new cases caused by each case if there
were no beds available to isolate them) shows a pattern of
multiple sub-outbreaks followed by brief periods of no trans-
mission, combined with an overall decline (figure 2f). The
longest sustained period of transmission was in the five weeks
between 30 June and 4 August, during which the reproduction
number can be seen to steadily increase. The subsequent peaks
inmid-August and earlyand lateOctober are significantly smal-
ler. After the first week of October, more than 78% of posterior
samples of the reproduction number were below 1.
We estimated that healthcare-seeking behaviour increased
during the course of the outbreak, from a median estimate of
36% (IQR 16–67, 95% CI 3–96) of the population seeking
healthcare at the beginning of June to a median estimate of
87% (IQR 72–96, 95% CI 26–100) at the end of October.
By comparing the late to early healthcare-seeking behaviour
on a sample-by-sample basis, our median estimate suggests
that individuals were 2.0 (IQR 1.3–4.3, 95% CI 1.0–21)
times as likely to seek healthcare late in the epidemic as
early. With the parameters in our model, isolation in the
ETC reduced the reproduction number of those that seek
healthcare to a fraction r ¼ 0.38 (median estimate, IQR
0.37–0.39, 95% CI 0.37–0.40), or by 66%. If individuals
were assumed to be twice as infectious during the later
stage of infection and burial, the effect was even stronger,
with r ¼ 0.33 (median estimate, IQR 0.32–0.34, 95% CI
0.31–0.35) or a 67% reduction of the reproduction number
of those seeking healthcare (implying safe burial).
Aggregated simulated trajectories of total incidence (in the
community and the ETC) under the scenarios of (i) no bed
expansion (and rejection of patients if no beds were available)and (ii) no change in healthcare-seeking behaviour from early
in the outbreak are shown in figure 5. The exact number of
cases and deaths prevented depended on the exact proportion
of healthcare seeking, which was only weakly identified in our
model. Comparing the scenarios on a (posterior) sample-
by-sample basis, we found that keeping capacity at 10 beds
(the official capacity) increased the overall number of cases
by a factor of 4.7 (median, IQR 2.1–14, 95% CI 1.1–59), while
keeping it at 40 (the number of patients for which the 10 bed
ETC was used during the period of overcrowding in July to
early August) increased the number of cases by a factor of 1.4
(median, IQR 1.2–1.8, 95% CI 1.0–2.8). Keeping healthcare-
seeking behaviour as it was at the beginning of the outbreak
increased the number of cases by a factor of 1.9 (median, IQR
1.2–5.2, 95% CI 1.0–109).
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Figure 5. Incidence of EVD under alternative scenarios. Incidence under the alternative scenarios of (a) lower ETC capacity and (b) no improvements in healthcare-
seeking behaviour. Shown are the median (line) and IQR (shaded area) at each time point.
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Lofa County was the first region in Liberia to experience the
2013–2015 EVD outbreak in West Africa, and it was struck
severely. A rapid rise in cases over the summer of 2014 was
followed by a fall in cases towards the end of August 2014,
and control by the end of October. The behaviour of the epi-
demic in Lofa mirrors what has been observed across many
regions of West Africa, and a better understanding of this
behaviour can yield important lessons for investigating the
epidemic elsewhere. Here, we analysed the impact of differ-
ent clinical and community-based interventions that were
put in place at different times, in an attempt to pinpoint
what exactly turned the epidemic around.
The main clinical intervention was the expansion of the
ETC in Foya from a capacity of 10 (although in fact used for
up to 40 patients during periods of overcrowding) to 100. We
have estimated that the provision of isolation enabled through
the expanded ETC reduced the reproduction number of those
who entered the ETC by about two-thirds and thus made a
strong contribution to the substantial decline in case numbers
observed in the three weeks following the opening of the
expanded ETC. Without the expansion, the outbreak would
have continued to grow for weeks longer, and we estimated
that hundreds of lives were potentially saved by this measure.
The national government imposed a state of emergency in
Liberia on 6 August. By closing markets, schools and restricting
public gatherings and movement across international borders,
thismeasuremayhave alteredpatterns of contact in communities
and contributed to preventing geographical spread, but possibly
not to a reduction in disease transmission, much of which occurs
among familymembers [51].At the same time, thedelay between
the development of symptoms and hospitalization of cases
increasedwhen case numberswere growing rapidly before stabi-
lizing after the ETC was expanded, and declining further as the
outbreak was well under control. Key observers have suggested
that the increase observed in June and early Julywas an indicator
of prevailing community attitudes at the time: denial of the EVD
outbreak, and reluctance to present for care because of the stigma
associated with the disease. With the ETC operating at capacity,
this could explain why it took longer to admit patients. More
prompt presentation for care from August onwards may reflect
a combination of greater availability of ETC beds, more positive
attitudes toward treatment, and greater community awareness
of the disease, however, one cannot ascertain the relative
contribution of these factors.From themodelling analysis, it appeared that the expansion
of the ETC capacity, occasional interruptions of transmission
and improvements in healthcare-seeking behaviour all contrib-
uted tomitigating the epidemic and eventually stopping it. Two
features stood out in the time-varying behaviour of the trans-
mission rate: one is that the epidemic in Lofa appeared to
have consisted of several subepidemics which intermittently
stoppedbefore starting again. This is consistentwith geographi-
cally heterogeneous dynamicswhere outbreaks flare up and are
subsequently controlled by a combination of local behavioural
change and targeted intervention, but potentially trigger out-
breaks elsewhere. The second feature is the overall decline in
the reproduction number from August, leading to eventual
extinction. This decline has been previously observed using a
model of behavioural change that did not include the detailed
information of the outbreak which we included here [24]. It is
impossible to establishwith certainty the reasons for the decline
from the available data, but a strong role of concurrent efforts of
the provision of clinical care and isolation and community
engagement is consistent with our findings.
The exact extent of healthcare-seeking behaviour was diffi-
cult to establish from fitting to hospital admission data alone,
which did not contain any information on how many cases
may still have been occurring in the community butwent unre-
ported. Still, our model suggests that it did appear to improve
between the beginning and the end of the epidemic. Interest-
ingly, much of the increase in healthcare-seeking behaviour
appeared to happen before the start of health-promotion activi-
ties, indicating that attitudes may have changed substantially
before the onset of these activities. In this context, it is
important to bear in mind that the time course of healthcare-
seeking behaviour was constrained by the particular structure
of the model we chose. While the transmission rate was
allowed to vary randomly and therefore increase and decrease
at any point in time, we assumed that healthcare-seeking
behaviour could only change in one direction over the course
of the outbreak. If we had allowed similar flexibility in the
way we modelled healthcare-seeking behaviour to the way
we modelled the changes in the transmission rate, it might
not have been possible to pinpoint these changes. The behav-
iour we found was consistent with observations that overall
attitudes towards health institutions improved during the
course of the epidemic. It helps explain the very sharp rise of
cases admitted to the ETC in July (which was stronger than
could be explained with a constant transmission rate), and it
aligns with the fact that the outbreak was eventually ended
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
372:20160302
10
 on November 21, 2017http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from relatively rapidly. Without further information on community
behaviour, however, it remains difficult to establish these
relationships with certainty.
More generally, it would be desirable in the course of future
outbreaks to implement concurrent community surveillance to
directly monitor total deaths and their causes, and measure a
limited number of key social variables. Assessing all-cause
mortality within the community could provide an estimate of
the number of suspect EVD cases in the community that did
not present to the ETC for care or were not provided a safe
community burial. This would allow ongoing measurement
of healthcare- and safe-burial-seeking behaviour, including
an estimate of the proportion of EVD in the community not
being identified and properly managed. Similarly, if one had
direct information on public attitudes (e.g. perception of the
ETC, EVD and its transmission, willingness to seek healthcare
if ill), such information could assist in not only more accurately
understanding and modelling the role of these factors in the
evolution of the outbreak, but also in tailoring social mobiliz-
ation efforts to increase their effectiveness in particular
communities. While such studies are clearly secondary to
immediate efforts to mitigate transmission and care for the
sick, they could provide crucial information for evaluating
and tailoring the ongoing outbreak response and planning
for future such events.Ethics. The research was approved by the London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine Research Ethics Committee (reference
number 8627).
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